WASHINGTON - The U.S. is trying to build missiles like it's going out of style, but there's a catch: the solid rocket motors that make them go whoosh are still a major bottleneck, according to a new report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
The report, which reads like a warning label for the Pentagon's ambitions, notes that solid rocket motors remain a choke point across the U.S. missile industrial base, even as the Defense Department gears up for a sharp increase in interceptor production. The Pentagon's 2027 budget request includes more than $73 billion for missile programs across mandatory and discretionary funding, up from a prior peak of $29 billion in 2024 - because apparently, when it comes to blowing things up, there's no such thing as too much.
The Pentagon expects deliveries of more than 2,100 air and missile defense interceptors in calendar year 2027, a roughly 70% increase from nearly 1,300 in 2021. But CSIS says that level remains well below the department's stated production goals of roughly 5,000 interceptors a year across Army, Navy, and Air Force programs. "Achieving these goals will require dealing with myriad challenges to increasing interceptor production," the report says, helpfully adding that the targets were set before Operation Epic Fury, which could increase pressure to replenish interceptors used in early 2026.
The study, sponsored by Raytheon Technologies, Ursa Major, and X-Bow Systems - which is like asking a baker to review a bakery - argues that the air and missile defense interceptor industrial base isn't configured for a long conflict with high missile-expenditure rates. A central concern is that solid rocket motors sit beneath nearly every major U.S. missile program. Problems in motor production, propellant ingredients, nozzles, inspection capacity, or the specialized workforce can ripple across multiple weapon lines, like a bad batch of office coffee.
The current constraints reflect years of consolidation. Between 2000 and 2015, the domestic solid rocket motor industry shrank from six suppliers to two: Aerojet Rocketdyne and Orbital ATK. Those companies are now part of L3Harris and Northrop Grumman, respectively - because nothing says "national security" like fewer options. A new group of entrants has since moved into the market, including X-Bow, Ursa Major, Firehawk, Castelion, Anduril, Nammo, Avio USA, and Prometheus Energetics. CSIS says those companies could eventually diversify the supply base, but many haven't yet shown they can move from prototypes or limited production into large production lots.
The report also points to a shift in the space industry. Commercial launch once helped support demand for solid rocket motors, particularly during the Space Shuttle era. But much of the commercial launch market has moved toward liquid propulsion, reducing the space sector's role as a stabilizing source of demand for solid motor suppliers. So, while SpaceX is busy reusing rockets, the Pentagon is stuck with the solid fuel equivalent of a disposable lighter.
CSIS argues that fixing the problem will require more than emergency funding. The report calls for stable demand signals, multiyear buying, direct investment in suppliers, requirements reform, and broader acceptance of new suppliers. The Pentagon's $1 billion investment in L3Harris solid rocket motor production is useful, the report says, but such direct-to-supplier intervention "cannot substitute for more proactive supply chain management by both the government and prime contractors." CSIS says these investments tend to address visible bottlenecks rather than prevent future ones, and can't replace sustained demand from the government customer.
The report also says acquisition rules and cost-focused requirements can make it harder to introduce new materials, components, and manufacturing processes. That can limit flexibility for established suppliers while slowing the entry of newer companies - because, as everyone knows, the best way to deal with a bottleneck is to make it harder to get through.